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Service Management 
and Employment Systems 
in U.S. and Indian Call Centers
The explosive growth of call centers in India has gained widespread attentionbecause of its potential impact on employment in the United States and
other advanced economies. Media accounts report that Indian operations are
more likely to use college-educated workers while paying one-tenth of U.S.
wages. Some argue that these advantages may allow Indian centers to outcom-
pete U.S. centers on both cost and quality.1 Nonetheless, complaints about poor
quality and security, as well as consumer backlash, have led some firms to pull
out of India, while leaders in the offshoring business such as General Electric
have sold their Indian operations altogether. High turnover rates have become a
particularly serious problem in recent years as an expanding number of employ-
ers compete for a small pool of educated employees, a trend that both increases
costs and undermines service quality. 
With heated debate more prevalent than systematic empirical investigation,
our understanding of this emerging sector is based largely on anecdotal evi-
dence. National figures on employment, industry trends, and the percentage of
centers operated in-house (as opposed to outsourced or offshore) are unreliable.2
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2. Data on numbers of call centers and employment come largely from interested parties, such
as India’s National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), and industry
Our own national survey of U.S. call centers suggests that after two decades of
rapid growth, the outsourced sector represents less than 15 percent of the mar-
ket; and Indian offshore centers cover a tiny fraction of the U.S. market.
In addition, there has been little or no research on management and employ-
ment practices in this sector, either in the United States or in India. In this paper,
therefore, we consider two questions. First, how similar or different are call cen-
ter management strategies and employment systems in each country? Here our
goal is to map the management practices adopted by three types of operations:
in-house centers in the United States, outsourced centers in the United States,
and offshore centers that are owned and operated by subcontractors in India and
serve the U.S. market. Are there systematic differences in these practices, or is
there a call center “production model” that has diffused across very different
institutional and organizational contexts? Second, what are the implications of
different management practices for outcomes such as turnover? In other words,
which practices explain the high levels of turnover in the industry? 
To answer these questions, we draw on an original establishment-level survey
of 330 call centers in the United States and India. We focus on customer contact
rather than back-office operations such as check processing or online order ful-
fillment. For each center, the survey provides information on the customer base,
market and ownership conditions, organizational characteristics, work functions,
workforce skills and training, call center technology, work organization, com-
pensation, and outcomes such as absenteeism and turnover. In the next section,
we discuss prior research that informs our study. We then present the study meth-
ods and analytic strategy and our findings. Finally we outline the study’s limita-
tions and implications for policy.
336 Brookings Trade Forum: 2005
consultants such as Datamonitor in the United States. NASSCOM put the number of call center
positions in India at 158,000 in 2004. For the United States in 2001, Datamonitor estimated a total
call center workforce of 2.5 million, with 88.7 percent located in in-house centers and 11.3 per-
cent in outsourced centers. It projected that by 2005 call center employment would grow by
14 percent, reaching a total of 2.86 million, with 13.4 percent located in outsourced centers (Data-
monitor 2001). That estimate is close to the 14.6 percent of U.S. centers outsourced that we found
in our 2004 national survey. 
Datamonitor bases its estimates on market research and the sale of call center work stations
and other technology. The numbers of work stations may underestimate employment because
they may be used for two or three shifts of workers. More recently, Datamonitor (2004) estimated
that the U.S. call center employment would fall to 2.7 million positions in 47,500 call centers by
2008. Our calculations, based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data, suggest a U.S. call center work-
force in 2004 of 3.97 million, or an upper limit of 3 percent of the workforce. These calculations
are limited by the available data. See appendix for a technical note on these calculations.
Prior Research
The first question we address in this study concerns the extent to which call
center management practices vary across markets and institutional settings. Call
centers represent a new industrial model driven by advances in information tech-
nologies that are now ubiquitous. These technologies facilitate the automation of
services through interactive voice recognition units, standardize customer trans-
actions through skill-based routing systems, create machine-paced operations
through automated call distribution systems, and routinize work through wide-
spread use of scripting and electronic monitoring.
However, research shows that service management strategies and employ-
ment systems vary substantially across centers that serve different industry and
customer segments, and that perform different work functions—from profes-
sional approaches to service to highly transactional or cost-driven ones.3 In this
line of research, work and employment systems typically are defined to include
three dimensions: (a) the level of education and training required; (b) the level
of discretion and collaborative problem-solving embedded in the design of
work; and (c) the level and type of compensation system designed to motivate
effort.4
The professional service model includes a set of employment practices
based on high skills and training, employee discretion and collaborative
problem-solving, and high relative pay.5 This approach to service management
is typically found in business-to-business centers and information technology
(IT) help desks or technical service centers. By contrast, centers that focus on
simple transactions, such as telemarketing, reservations, or credit card han-
dling, require relatively low skills, and jobs are likely to be highly routinized
with low pay. Quality control is ensured through extensive use of electronic
monitoring systems.6
A more complex question is how to explain the variation in customer contact
centers that fall between these two extremes: centers that target the mass market
or a mixture of markets and that provide service and sales for products that entail
some degree of complexity along with opportunities to bundle services and cus-
tomize offerings. These represent the overwhelming majority of contact centers,
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4. Appelbaum and others (2000); Batt (2002).
5. Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger (1997); Batt (2002). 
6. Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger (1997). 
serving customers in such sectors as financial services, insurance, telecommu-
nications, and a variety of manufacturing industries. Here, management strate-
gies vary considerably in how much weight they give to competing on quality
and mass customization7 versus focusing primarily on cost.
In-house versus Outsourced Strategies 
How does the variation in call center management strategies and employ-
ment systems align with their ownership status—that is, with whether call cen-
ters are in-house, outsourced, or offshore operations? There are many reasons to
believe that outsourced and offshore centers will adopt management strategies
that focus more on controlling costs than on investing in employees. First, out-
sourcing allows firms to avoid paying the high wages associated with internal
equity norms and internal labor markets or union contracts.8 Several studies have
found that subcontractors hire workers at lower pay and benefits to do the same
work.9 Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg (2003) found that this is particularly
true for low-skilled work, where subcontracting led to the loss of union repre-
sentation as well as lower pay and benefits. 
Second, the literature on transaction cost economics suggests that outsourced
centers will focus on cost reduction because, as work is turned over to a third
party, the client firm must absorb the costs of monitoring and contract enforce-
ment.10 Thus, client firms are likely to exert pressure on subcontractors to keep
costs low in order to justify the additional transaction costs of managing the
vendor relationship. In addition, client firms worry about the operational risks
associated with third-party subcontracting and as a result are likely to outsource
those processes that are easily standardized or codified and monitored through
objective performance metrics. As research by Ravi Aron and Ying Liu (this vol-
ume) shows, the more work processes are codified and the higher the number of
performance metrics agreed upon by the buyer and seller, the lower the opera-
tional risk. Other research also demonstrates that subcontractors drive efficiency
through greater work intensity and capital utilization than in-house operations.11
Grugulis, Vincent, and Hebson (2003) examined outsourcing in three functions
requiring radically different levels of skill and complexity and found that in each
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7. Pine (1993). 
8. On internal labor markets see Abraham (1990); on union contracts, see Pfeffer and Baron
(1988). 
9. See, for example, Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993).
10. Williamson (1985). 
11. Marsden (1999).
case the process of subcontracting led to higher levels of employee monitoring,
adherence to specific performance metrics, and lower levels of employee dis-
cretion. For consumers, high levels of process standardization also reduce ser-
vice quality by limiting options for customization and relying on menus and
self-servicing.
In the call center industry these issues are likely to be particularly salient
because arm’s-length contracting and attention to the bottom line are wide-
spread, and contract enforcement typically is ensured through ongoing monitor-
ing and adherence to performance metrics.12 Performance management tech-
nologies such as electronic monitoring systems provide real-time measures of
talk times, adherence to schedules and scripted texts, and sales productivity,
allowing client companies to regularly monitor the employees of subcontractors.
Thus, subcontractors are under intense pressure to contain costs and meet these
efficiency goals.
The work of Levy and Murnane (2004) on computers, skills, and the organi-
zation of work provides additional insights into the process of subcontracting.
They have argued persuasively that computers are best able to automate jobs that
require rules-based logic, such as data management and order processing—pre-
cisely the kinds of jobs frequently found in call centers. Automation does not
eliminate all jobs, but creates standardized work processes that reduce opera-
tional risk and allow electronic monitoring of a wide range of performance met-
rics. Once these processes are computerized and standardized, they are more
easily outsourced to third-party vendors. However, more complex processes
with higher levels of uncertainty are more likely to be retained in-house, where
companies have direct control over operations that require more tacit knowl-
edge and entail more nuanced interactions with customers.
The strategic management literature on core competencies provides another
perspective on how and why outsourced work systems are likely to be more
cost-focused and standardized than those managed in-house.13 Core competen-
cies are defined as those that contribute value to customer benefits and end prod-
ucts, that provide access to a wide variety of markets, and that are difficult for
competitors to imitate.14 In theory, firms should retain functions that they con-
sider to be their core competency while outsourcing those functions that are
noncore. When applied to the choice of employment systems, the theory sug-
gests that firms should retain human capital that creates value for the firm, is rare
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or unique, and is difficult to imitate.15 For example, firms are likely to choose
internal employment systems for operations that involve firm-specific knowl-
edge and skills, team-based systems, or work processes that involve “social com-
plexity,” “causal ambiguity,” or “idiosyncratic learning.”16 They are likely to
externalize or subcontract work that is more generic, involves lower-order skills,
or is transactional in nature. Much call center work appears to fall into this lat-
ter category, and thus would be viewed as a prime candidate for outsourcing.
According to this argument, whether call center work is outsourced depends
on whether customer relationship management is considered central to a firm’s
competitiveness. If the products and services offered by a company are rela-
tively complex, involving firm-specific knowledge of products, processes, or
customers, then firms are likely to retain their customer service and sales func-
tions in-house. Similarly, if companies seek to compete on quality service or
customer loyalty, they are also likely to keep call center work in-house because
they do not want to lose control of their customer base or have their customers
treated generically—in the same fashion as the customers of their competitors,
who may be using the same call center subcontractor. 
For high-value-added customers, such as business customers, firms are par-
ticularly likely to use a strategy of service quality, customization, and loyalty and
therefore retain business-to-business channels in-house.17 For mass-market ser-
vice channels, the costs and benefits of keeping operations in-house are more
ambiguous from a strategy perspective; and there appears to be considerable
variation in what companies actually do. Although the number of call center
subcontractors grew dramatically in the 1990s in the United States, at least
85 percent of contact centers in this country continue to be in-house operations.18
This would suggest that a large majority of firms view their customer service and
sales operations as central to their competitiveness—or at least have not yet
become convinced that they should outsource them.
The implications of these arguments for the design of work and employment
systems are straightforward. Companies are more likely to retain in-house ser-
vices that are complex, that involve customer transactions that are nuanced or
uncertain, and that provide services to highly valued customers. In order to meet
the demands of these types of products and customers, they are more likely to
use a strategy of service quality and customization, and therefore to adopt a
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18. See Datamonitor (2001, 2003); Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon (2004). 
more professional approach to service. Centers that are operated by subcontrac-
tors, either in the United States or offshore, by contrast, are more likely to com-
pete on costs through lower wages and benefits, more standardized work
processes, and higher levels of performance monitoring.
Outsourced versus Offshore Strategies 
The academic literature provides much less guidance for predicting the dif-
ferences between U.S. outsourced and offshore centers operated by Indian sub-
contractors. On the one hand, arguments regarding the likelihood of a more cost-
based strategy in outsourced operations may be equally or more relevant to
offshore subcontractors. U.S. companies have sent work overseas to take advan-
tage of lower wages, but at the same time they are concerned about the level of
service quality provided. They also worry about consumer backlash and the
security and privacy of financial databases. A recent survey of U.S. executives
reported that the top driver for moving operations offshore was cost savings,
while the top reasons for staying onshore were security and service quality.19
For these reasons, U.S. companies may impose tighter constraints on mana-
gerial discretion in Indian centers and higher levels of performance monitoring
and adherence to call center metrics. If so, then we would expect the work and
employment systems in Indian call centers to be more tightly constrained and
standardized than those found among U.S. subcontractors. But unique condi-
tions in the Indian labor market suggest that both the reasons for moving work
to this segment and the incentives for investing in employees may differ from
those in the U.S. outsourced sector. First, the offshore workforce tends to be
drawn from a relatively small pool of college-educated, middle-class Indians.
We might expect these employees to be more self-motivated, allowing managers
to rely on more professional, or at least quasi-professional, employment prac-
tices to motivate their workforce. Moreover, given the large cost advantages that
Indian centers enjoy, there is opportunity to relax adherence to performance met-
rics such as talk time so that employees can use their skills to respond more
effectively to customer requests. 
In addition, the growing competition for these employees has put pressure
on employers to invest in benefits intended to promote commitment and
reduce turnover. Many call centers serving the international market occupy
sprawling complexes outfitted with gyms and canteens. They often provide
employees with free lunches and door-to-door taxi services and seek to create
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a “fun” environment with games and prizes. The additional investment in
“accent neutralization” training required by many companies, which averages
one to two weeks, makes it particularly costly to lose employees. Moreover,
the use of fixed employment contracts in India also means that there is a long
wait for new employees, which increases the expense of recruitment. One
manager of a multinational third-party center explained:
You have to think about hiring way, way ahead. . . . Let’s say I was trying
to hire someone from another company in India; she has to give thirty
days’ notice, so I have a delay for the thirty days. And once I get her, she
has to do the normal products training, but she also goes through two and
a half to three weeks of accent neutralization training. So there is a long,
long wait for employees offshore. It’s a month longer than in the U.S.,
easy. (Interview, March 2005) 
In sum, the unique labor market conditions and cost advantages of Indian off-
shore centers suggest that they will adopt a less cost-driven approach to work
and employment systems than subcontractors located in the United States.
Management Practices and Turnover 
The second question we ask in this paper is how the different management
strategies adopted across segments of the market translate into organizational
outcomes. Empirical research on the performance effects of alternative
approaches to service management has expanded in recent years. There is grow-
ing evidence that a more professional, or at least quasi-professional, approach is
associated with higher employee satisfaction and customer satisfaction, higher
sales productivity, lower turnover and higher sales growth, and higher service
quality and higher net revenues.20
Low-cost systems, by contrast, typically are associated with high levels of
employee dissatisfaction, absenteeism, and turnover; and these in turn often pro-
duce added costs, reduce options for customization, and lead to lower service
quality. For example, several studies of call center workers have found that rou-
tinized work design and high levels of electronic monitoring lead to stress, anx-
iety, depression, emotional exhaustion, and burnout.21 Deery, Iverson, and Walsh
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Totterdell (2002); Holman (2004). 
found that customer interactions, scripts, routinization, workloads, and manage-
rial emphasis on quantity predicted emotional exhaustion, which in turn pre-
dicted absenteeism. Singh demonstrated that as worker burnout with customers
increased, call center workers were able to maintain their productivity levels, but
their self-reported quality was lower. 
In this paper, we focus on turnover because it is extremely high in the indus-
try and viewed as a major problem by employers. Industry analysts estimate that
it averages between 30 and 70 percent in the United States, but in our interviews
some managers reported rates of 100 to 150 percent annually. In India, news
reports suggest that turnover rates are often 50 percent or higher. Voluntary
turnover, or the employee quit rate, is of particular interest to organizational
researchers because it represents a large cost to employers. When employees
leave, their experience and the firm’s investments in training are lost. Moreover,
as noted earlier, the factors that influence turnover also influence other important
outcomes, including employee motivation, service quality, and labor costs. 
Empirical studies of voluntary turnover have found that it is significantly
related to human resource practices,22 particularly with respect to work design
and compensation. Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and Gupta (1998) found that quit rates
were lower when monitoring and work intensity were lower and pay and bene-
fit levels were higher. Similarly, Batt, Colvin, and Keefe (2002) found that
greater discretion and collaboration at work coupled with high relative pay pre-
dicted lower quit rates while high levels of electronic monitoring and use of
commission-based pay led to higher quit rates.
Expected Findings 
We have argued above that ownership status is likely to be associated with
particular approaches to work and employment practices. Based on the theoret-
ical and empirical literature, we expect that in-house, outsourced, and offshore
establishments will differ systematically in their service management and
employment systems. In comparison with outsourced or offshore centers, in-
house establishments are more likely to adopt employment practices that involve
a higher educated and better trained workforce, that provide employees with
more discretion and problem-solving capability, and that offer higher relative
pay. We also expect differences between outsourced and offshore centers, with
the latter more likely to adopt a professional approach to employment manage-
ment than the former. These differences in choice of employment system, in
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turn, should explain variation in turnover rates, with the more professional
approach associated with significantly lower turnover. In other words, work and
employment practices should partially explain the relationship between owner-
ship status and turnover. To examine these arguments, we developed a model of
turnover that includes controls for market and organizational characteristics,
while examining the independent variables of ownership status and employment
system characteristics, as follows:
Turnover = f(market and organizational characteristics,
ownership status, education and training,
work organization, compensation strategy) 
Methods 
Sample 
The sample for this study is based on two identical establishment-level sur-
veys conducted in the United States and India between mid-2003 and mid-2004.
The U.S. survey was administered to a stratified random sample of 472 call cen-
ters drawn from the subscriber lists of Call Center Magazine (60 percent of the
sample) and the Dun and Bradstreet listing of establishments in the telecommu-
nications industry (40 percent of the sample). Using the two lists was necessary
to identify call centers in different industries. A survey team conducted the sur-
vey by telephone with a forty-minute average interview, yielding a 65.4 percent
response rate. The sample was reduced to 464 after eliminating outliers and
observations that were missing substantial data.
The Indian survey was administered to a nonrandom sample of sixty Indian
call centers compiled from Internet sites and the membership list of the National
Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) in India. The re-
search team focused on six cities with large call center concentrations (Chennai,
Kolkata, Bangalore, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Delhi). In each city, the research
team had one week to contact the call centers on the list, make appointments,
and conduct the survey, which averaged ninety-five minutes in length. The team
did not target any particular type of center, but rather conducted surveys on a first
come, first-served basis as appointments were made. 
All survey respondents were asked to answer questions pertaining to the
“core” workforce in their establishment: the largest group of customer contact
employees who carry out the primary work activity at that location. Owing to
variations in the sample, we use a portion of the full dataset in this analysis.
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First, we restrict our sample to three market segments: large business, mass mar-
ket, and all markets. We dropped 106 small business centers and ten operator
services centers from the U.S. sample, since these segments were not present in
the Indian sample. Second, we excluded sixteen call centers that serve only the
Indian domestic market (located primarily in Kolkata) because only the interna-
tional centers serve the U.S. market. These exclusions reduced the sample size
to 392. Because of randomly missing observations in the dataset, our regression
analyses are based on a sample of 310 call centers (237 U.S. in-house, 42 U.S.
outsourced, and 31 Indian offshore).
In both the United States and India, we conducted extensive site visits in dif-
ferent industry segments to aid with the design of the survey and the interpreta-
tion of results. In the United States, we visited twelve in-house call centers and
six outsourced call centers, where we interviewed managers, supervisors, and
employees on various aspects of their human resource policies and work design
strategies. In India, each survey was administered onsite, allowing the researcher
to cross-check responses and providing an additional test of the reliability of sur-
vey responses.
Measures 
The independent variables of interest include the ownership status of the cen-
ter (in-house, outsourced, or offshore), and the work and employment system, as
defined along three dimensions: human capital (employee education and train-
ing), work design (opportunities for discretion and problem solving), and
rewards (compensation practices). To determine whether an establishment was
in-house or outsourced in the U.S. sample, respondents were asked how they
would best describe the call center: as an in-house center providing services to
their company or as a subcontractor providing services to other companies. The
offshore segment includes Indian call centers that serve an international market.
Almost all of the Indian centers were owned and operated by Indian subcon-
tractors, with only a handful owned by U.S. subsidiaries or U.S. subcontractors. 
To measure human capital, we control for the sex composition of the work-
force and use two measures of education and training: the years of formal edu-
cation of the typical worker in the call center and employer investment in initial
training (an additive index of the number of weeks of initial training an
employee receives and the number of weeks to become qualified). For work
design, three measures capture the extent to which employees have opportuni-
ties for discretion and problem solving. First, discretion over customer interac-
tions is measured by the variable script use, based on a 1 to 5 Likert response to
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the question, “To what extent are core employees required to use scripts when
talking to a customer?” where 1 is “not at all” and 5 is “a great deal.” Second, we
used three measures to construct a work discretion index, again based on Likert-
type questions. Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which core employ-
ees had discretion over their daily work tasks; tools, methods, or procedures; and
pace of work. The three measures were highly correlated (p < .001) and were
combined into a mean index. The third measure of discretion, percent in offline
teams, is the percentage of employees who participate with supervisors in
problem-solving groups or teams.
The final group of variables measure compensation practices, including total
compensation and percent commission pay. We were unable to use average
annual salary in the analysis owing to the large differences in pay between the
United States and India. While there are national statistics in the United States
on average compensation for customer service and sales employees, it is difficult
to find accurate information on the typical pay of a call center employee in India.
We therefore constructed a pay ratio measure based on the ratio of a call center’s
average gross annual pay to the median pay in each full country sample ($29,000
in the United States and $2,444 in India). Informal documentation from indus-
try publications gave similar estimates for average pay levels in the Indian mar-
ket. The U.S. median pay in our sample was also similar to estimates from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the median pay of customer service representa-
tives ($28,720). Percent commission pay is measured as the percentage of total
annual pay that is based on individual commission.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE. The dependent variable of interest is the average
annual quit rate, as reported by managers for the previous calendar year. A
square root transformation was used to correct for the non-normal distribution of
the variable.
CONTROL VARIABLES. We included additional controls for common turnover
determinants. The primary customer segment served by employees has been
found in several previous studies of front-line service workplaces to influence
both management practices and turnover rates.23 Call centers serving higher-
value-added segments, such as large business customers, can be expected to
invest more both in the skills of the workforce and in employee retention, as well
as to be more selective in hiring, which reduces quit rates. Call centers serving
multiple market segments typically have a broader skill base and more diverse
job requirements. We thus control for whether the establishment serves prima-
rily large business, mass market, or multiple market segments. We also control
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for union presence, which has been found in past studies to be negatively corre-
lated with quit rates.24 Employees in unionized establishments are able to exer-
cise “voice” versus “exit,” which leads to improved pay and working conditions
and reduces turnover.25
In earlier analyses we tested the effects of several other control variables that
have been used in past studies of turnover, including systematic selection pro-
cedures for hiring new employees, the ratio of applicants hired, whether the call
center was part of a larger organization, and the age of the call center. We also
analyzed variation in outcomes when controls for industry and type of call cen-
ter work were added, including a control for whether the call center predomi-
nantly handled sales or customer service. None of these had a substantial effect
on the coefficients of the independent variables of interest and either reduced or
had a negligible effect on the overall Chi-square. Several of these additional con-
trols were also highly correlated with other variables included in the model. For
example, both the outsourced and offshore centers have a significantly lower
average age than in-house call centers. Thus, in the final model we included a
more parsimonious list of control variables that captured key measures of mar-
kets and organizational characteristics.
Results 
Comparison of Mean Characteristics 
Table 1 presents a comparison of organizational characteristics, workforce
characteristics, employment system variables, and organizational outcomes for
the in-house, outsourced, and offshore centers. We use a broader range of vari-
ables here than were included in our analysis of turnover antecedents to provide
a more comprehensive picture of how organizational characteristics and man-
agement practices differ across the segments. In addition, in order to make com-
parisons more precise, we restricted the mean comparison in table 1 to nonunion
call centers serving mass-market or multiple customer segments.
We tested the significance of mean differences using one-way analysis of
variance. In general, there are significant differences in most dimensions of
organizational characteristics and work and employment systems across the
three types of centers. The patterns are consistent with our expectations, but
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Table 1. Mean Comparison: In-house, Outsourced, and Offshore Call Centers 
Percent unless otherwise indicated
ANOVA
In-house Outsourced Offshore p < .05
Organizational characteristics
Establishment age in years 15.7 9.4 3.4 a,b,c
Part of a larger organization 79.6 75.9 78.9
Sales-oriented call centers 5.0 13.8 29.4 b
Workforce characteristics
Female 68.9 71.5 43.1 b,c
Tenure of less than one year 28.1 36.8 61.8 a,b,c
Part-time 17.6 35.6 1.0 a,b,c
Training and qualification
Average years of education 13.3 12.6 14.0 a,b,c
Typical education (high school) 38.3 69.0 36.4 a,c
Days of initial training 19.7 11.5 23.6 a,c
Days to become qualified 66.8 44.2 53.3
Days of ongoing training per year 9.6 10.4 11.2
Employee discretion
Reliance on scripted textsd 9.9 48.3 32.4 a,b
Discretion over workd 9.9 3.4 5.9
Discretion over handling customer 
requestsd 39.2 17.2 2.9 a,b,c
Participation in offline teams 36.2 22.2 6.9 b,c
Performance monitoring
Work time electronically monitored 49.5 67.7 91.7 a,b,c
Frequency of supervisor monitoringe 49.7 67.9 82.4 b 
Frequency of feedback and coachinge 46.0 55.2 94.1 b,c
Compensation
Average annual pay ($)f 27,713 23,881 2,635 a,b,c
Pay based on commission 8.4 4.1 18.5 b,c
Turnover and absenteeism
Quits 15.8 25.6 24.5 a,b
Total turnover (quits + dismissals) 24.6 41.2 29.6 a,c
Absenteeism 5.5 8.9 5.3 a,c
Sample size 181 29 34
a. In-house and outsourced are significantly different.
b. In-house and offshore are significantly different.
c. Outsourced and offshore are significantly different.
d. Percentage answering “a lot” or “a great deal” (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale).
e. Percentage with weekly to daily performance monitoring
f. Gross annual earnings
there are important exceptions and contradictory patterns as well. Overall, in-
house centers tend to adopt a more quasi-professional approach to employment
than either outsourced or offshore centers. They offer jobs with substantially
more opportunities for discretion and problem solving, make significantly less
use of electronic monitoring and performance management systems, and offer
higher pay. Associated with these patterns are significantly higher rates of orga-
nizational tenure and lower turnover rates than those found in either outsourced
or offshore centers. For example, while 28 percent of the workforce in U.S. in-
house centers has less than one year of tenure, the comparable rate in outsourced
centers is 37 percent, and in offshore centers 62 percent. The annual employee
quit rate alone is reported at 16 percent in-house centers, 26 percent in out-
sourced centers, and 25 percent in offshore sites—that is, it is over 55 percent
higher than in the in-house centers.
The exception to this pattern is that offshore centers rely on workers with
somewhat more formal education than those in in-house locations. The typical
worker in an Indian center has 14 years of education (on average two years of
college) compared to 13.3 years among U.S. in-house establishments. Yet these
differences are not as great as often portrayed in the media. Close to 40 percent
of managers in both types of centers (38 percent in-house and 36 percent off-
shore) reported that the typical worker in their establishment has a high school
education. Similar patterns hold for initial training, with offshore call centers
providing 4.7 weeks on average, and in-house centers 3.9 weeks. However,
given that much of the initial training in Indian centers is focused on accent neu-
tralization, it appears that Indian centers do not provide more initial training for
other aspects of the job.
The comparison between U.S. outsourced and Indian offshore centers yields
results that do not match our expectations. On the one hand, the formal educa-
tion levels of Indian centers are substantially higher than those found among
U.S. subcontractors, where the typical worker has an average education of
12.6 years and almost 70 percent of managers report that the typical worker has
a high school diploma only. Initial training in U.S. outsourced centers is less than
half that found in Indian centers. However, the amount of on-the-job training to
become qualified and the annual rates of ongoing training are not substantially
different. 
On the other hand, despite relying on a more educated and full-time work-
force, the Indian centers have work systems that are more tightly constrained and
standardized than those found among U.S. subcontractors, contrary to our
expectations. With the exception of reliance on scripts, which is higher in the
U.S. outsourced centers, Indian managers report substantially lower levels of
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discretion in handling customer requests and use of problem-solving groups.
For example, only 3 percent of offshore call centers report giving employees “a
lot” or “a great deal” of discretion in handling customer requests, compared to
17 percent of outsourced centers and 39 percent of in-house centers. While in-
house centers have an average of 36 percent of employees working in teams,
22 percent of employees in outsourced centers and only 7 percent of those in off-
shore centers do so. 
Measures of performance monitoring illustrate a similar pattern. Most call
centers adopt a mix of practices to track employee performance on adherence to
talk time, whether they follow the scripts provided, and their effectiveness in
both providing friendly service and resolving customer requests. In a sales envi-
ronment, monitoring is also used both to control potential employee fraud and to
provide coaching on selling techniques. Both electronic monitoring and super-
visor monitoring and feedback are employed for this purpose, and the intensity
of these practices varies substantially among the different sites. While about
50 percent of work time in in-house centers is electronically monitored, this
average jumps to 68 percent in outsourced centers and 92 percent in offshore
centers. Similarly, supervisors provide feedback and coaching on a weekly or
daily basis in 94 percent of the offshore centers, but in only 46 and 55 percent of
the U.S. in-house and outsourced centers.
With respect to compensation, the average median annual pay reported by
managers is $27,713 among in-house centers, $23,881 in outsourced centers,
and $2,635 in offshore centers. Thus, in-house centers pay about 14 percent
more than outsourced centers and 90 percent more than the offshore segment.
The use of commission pay is surprisingly low across the in-house and out-
sourced segments, at 8 and 4 percent, but significantly higher in offshore centers
(19 percent). This probably reflects the higher percentage of sales-oriented call
centers in the offshore sample (29 percent) than in the in-house (5 percent) and
outsourced (14 percent) sites.
Finally, we compare turnover and absenteeism, both important organizational
outcomes. High investments in training at many workplaces mean that turnover
is costly, and the often tight scheduling practices based on predicted fluctuations
in call volume mean that excessive absenteeism has an immediate negative effect
on customer satisfaction and sales. As noted earlier, quit rates as well as total
turnover are the lowest among in-house centers and higher in outsourced and
offshore centers. Absenteeism, by contrast, is highest in the U.S. outsourced seg-
ment (9 percent) and lower in both in-house and offshore centers (6 percent and
5 percent respectively). These measures capture the motivation of the workforce
to show up and meet performance expectations and are largely in line with our
350 Brookings Trade Forum: 2005
other results that indicate that outsourced centers tend to adopt a low-commit-
ment employment system that combines low pay with intensive monitoring and
low discretion.
Owing to variation in the industries represented in each sample, we checked
to see whether these patterns held when the sample was further broken down.
For example, we compared centers serving high-end customers as well as those
in telecommunications and financial services and found similar patterns. That is,
no particular sectors accounted for the variation found across in-house, out-
sourced, and offshore sites.
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 2 provides the means, standard deviations, and pairwise correlations of
the variables included in the final model. For our analyses of turnover, we esti-
mate left-censored Tobit models because the dependent variable is truncated at
zero.26
PREDICTORS OF TURNOVER. Table 3 reports estimates of models for quit
rates at the establishments. The first equation, model 1, includes the market seg-
ment and organizational characteristics. The second equation adds controls for
employee human capital, while the third and fourth add measures of work organ-
ization and compensation practices. 
In the first model, after controlling for market segment, outsourced and off-
shore centers have significantly higher quit rates (compared to the omitted vari-
able, in-house centers), while unionized centers are associated with significantly
lower quits. 
In model 2, both the length of initial training investment and years of educa-
tion are significantly associated with lower quit rates. The percentage of the
workforce that is female is positively associated with higher quits, but this rela-
tionship becomes insignificant in the full model. Offshore ownership status con-
tinues to be positive and significant at the p < .001 level, while the significance
of outsourced status decreases but is still marginally significant. With the intro-
duction of work design variables in model 3, neither outsourced nor offshore sta-
tus remains significant, and human capital variables decline in significance.
Work discretion and the use of problem-solving groups are significantly nega-
tively associated with quit rates (p < .001), while script use is positively associ-
ated (p < .10). In the full model (4), union presence, training investments, work
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discretion, use of problem-solving groups, and the pay ratio are all significantly
associated with lower quit rates, while script use and percent commission pay
are associated with higher quits.
We estimated the effect sizes of the Tobit coefficients by decomposing them
into estimates of changes in outcomes above the left censored limit and changes
in the probability of observing an outcome above the left limit.27 This provides
an interpretation equivalent to OLS estimates.28 The Tobit coefficients in the
model are 0.62 of the OLS coefficients. Thus when the work discretion index
changes by one standard deviation, quit rates decrease by 0.45 percentage points
(0.62  –0.73); a one-standard-deviation increase in the percentage of employ-
ees who participate in offline teams decreases the quit rate by 1.08 percentage
points (p < .001). 
352 Brookings Trade Forum: 2005
27. McDonald and Moffitt (1980). 
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tion is calculated by multiplying the Tobit coefficients by [1–z*f(z)/F(z) – f(z)2/F(z)2], where F(z)
is the cumulative normal distribution function associated with the probability of cases being above
the left limit, f(z), the first derivative of F(z) is the unit normal density associated with this prob-
ability, and z is the corresponding z score for this probability. See Roncek (1992).
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviation, and Pairwise Correlations
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1 Square root of annual quit rate 3.23 2.22
2 Large business segment 0.34 0.47 –0.16
3 Multiple market segments 0.19 0.40 0.02 –0.35
4 Mass-market segment 0.47 0.50 0.13 –0.67 –0.46
5 Union presence 0.08 0.27 –0.22 0.00 –0.05 0.04
6 U.S. in-house 0.76 0.42 –0.27 –0.04 –0.04 0.06
7 U.S. outsourced 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.12 –0.12 –0.01
8 Indian offshore 0.10 0.30 0.24 –0.08 0.19 –0.08
9 Percent female 0.64 0.25 0.08 –0.25 –0.04 0.27
10 Years education 13.53 1.64 –0.19 0.21 0.01 –0.21
11 Initial training investment 19.01 17.73 –0.23 0.06 0.00 –0.05
12 Script use 2.19 1.20 0.27 –0.03 0.03 0.01
13 Work discretion index 2.60 0.92 –0.37 0.15 0.07 –0.19
14 Percent in offline teams 0.36 0.38 –0.36 0.17 –0.05 –0.12
15 Pay ratio 1.19 0.60 –0.31 0.44 –0.11 –0.33
16 Percent of pay based on commission 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.11 –0.02 –0.09
Notes: For all correlations greater than .11, p <.05.
SD: Standard deviation.
Discussion, Limitations, and Policy Implications 
In this study, we examined the extent of variation in service management and
employment strategies among in-house, outsourced, and Indian offshore call
centers that provide similar services to U.S. customers. We found significant
differences in the patterns of employment practices and related outcomes across
these three settings, but not in ways that were entirely anticipated. In this sam-
ple of establishments, in-house centers tended to adopt a more coherent quasi-
professional approach to service interactions than outsourced and offshore sites,
with in-house jobs characterized by relatively higher levels of initial investments
in training and pay, discretion, and problem-solving opportunities. Offshore cen-
ters, by contrast, had somewhat higher levels of formal education and initial
training than in-house centers, but significantly lower levels of employee dis-
cretion and problem solving opportunities, and higher levels of electronic mon-
itoring and performance management. From a managerial perspective, U.S. out-
sourced centers seem to present the worst of both worlds: a workforce with
lower levels of formal education and training than in-house or offshore centers,
low levels of discretion and problem solving opportunities that closely resemble
those of offshore centers, and levels of pay much closer to those found among
in-house operations than among Indian centers.
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In further multivariate analyses, we found that outsourced and offshore cen-
ters had significantly higher quit rates after controlling for the market segment
served, union presence, and measures of employee human capital. Systematic
differences in work design explained most of the variation in quit rates, so the
significance of ownership status disappeared when these practices were included
in our equations. That is, ownership status is an important driver in the choice of
management and employment practices, with outsourced and offshore centers
more constrained to use standardized operating procedures and performance
monitoring. It is these practices, in turn, that explain the higher quit rates in these
centers. 
There are several limitations to this study. One concerns the representative-
ness of our samples, which we discussed earlier. Because larger organizations
are overrepresented, if anything the study overstates the level of workforce edu-
cation, pay, and levels of employee participation in call centers. We have no rea-
son to believe that the bias is greater in one sample or the other, but there is really
no way to test this deficiency in the data. A second limitation is that these large-
scale surveys provide only single-sourced data, and external labor market data
from India are not available to compare the relative value of call center pay in
that country with pay levels in the United States. 
A third limitation is that we cannot determine whether differences in man-
agement and employment systems are due to differences in the complexity of
work functions or differences in business strategies based on quality and cost.
Complexity and quality service strategies are highly correlated, such that com-
panies tend to adopt quality strategies for higher-value-added functions, which
typically are more complex in nature. In our analysis of average differences
across ownership types, we used various methods to compare centers by indus-
try and customer segment as well as work function. In each of these analyses, we
found systematic differences based on ownership type. However, sample size
restrictions prevent us from determining whether these differences are due to
business strategies or service complexity, or some combination of both.
In addition, the outcome measured in this study is limited. On the one hand,
turnover is a useful metric to analyze because the industry has unusually high
levels of workforce churn, which is widely recognized to be problematic and
costly. There is also considerable empirical evidence to show that turnover is
associated with lower service quality and productivity. On the other hand, future
research needs to examine a much wider array of performance measures that
directly capture operational quality and productivity if we are to understand the
relative costs and benefits of alternative service management strategies. 
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Despite these limitations, the findings are consistent with other research on
subcontracting relations. For example, subcontractors are more likely to have
standardized processes and to use more performance monitoring and metrics, a
pattern that supports Ravi Aron and Ying Liu’s argument in this volume that
these practices are central to reducing operational risk. Aron’s finding that work-
force training does not have a large effect on reducing operational risk is also
consistent with our analysis. Despite the fact that offshore centers in India hire
college-educated workers and offer considerable initial training, the high levels
of process standardization do not let employees use their human capital in ways
that can improve operational performance. This point is reiterated in the work of
Vivek Agrawal (this volume), who demonstrates that the return to investment in
technology in Indian call centers is far below that found in the United States. He
notes that this “cookbook” approach to management reduces the incentives to
innovate and constrains the ability to move up the value chain.
Our findings have several policy implications at the level of managerial strat-
egy and broader public policy. For management, the evidence is clear that the
extensive use of routinized work processes in call centers leads to high turnover,
which limits options for customization and is associated with lower service qual-
ity and productivity. Moreover, to the extent that call centers hire college-
educated workers, the highly constrained and monitored work system creates an
inefficient use of human capital: a particularly bad fit between selection and
recruitment policies on the one hand, and between selection and work design
policies on the other. The underutilization of human capital represents a sub-
stantial loss for Indian subcontractors, who are paying for skills that they are not
using.
Thus, to the extent that companies have complex service offerings or want to
compete on the basis of service differentiation, quality, or customer loyalty, they
are likely to retain customer contact interactions in-house, consistent with the
transaction costs perspective and core competency argument. To date this
appears to be what most U.S. corporations are doing: after two decades of rapid
growth of U.S. call centers, most industry estimates are consistent with our own
survey that less than 15 percent of U.S. call centers are run by third-party sub-
contractors, and only a tiny fraction have moved offshore. 
However, for those transactions that are simple and codifiable, it is likely that
companies will continue expanding their operations offshore. Our data suggest
that the strategy of outsourcing operations to U.S. subcontractors is likely to be
a transitory one because the modest reductions in labor costs (compared with
those of subcontractors offshore) may be offset by the high costs of turnover and
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low levels of employee skill. According to this scenario, the U.S. subcontracting
sector, which grew dramatically in the 1990s, will be the hardest hit by Indian
competition. If these findings hold across a larger and more representative sam-
ple of establishments, then the shift in customer contact employment from the
United States to India is likely to be considerable but remain confined to stand-
alone work functions that are relatively simple or transactional. Under this sce-
nario, the problem for both U.S. and Indian subcontractors is that stand-alone
call centers appear to be failing (see Dossani, this volume).
An alternative scenario is that Indian call centers will gain the ability to com-
pete more fully on the basis of quality and customer service as well as price. In
theory, this is possible. With an educated workforce and high relative pay for the
Indian labor market, Indian centers could be poised to handle more complex
and nuanced customer transactions and provide service that builds customer loy-
alty. However, the current work systems are not in any way geared toward that
alternative, but rather contain fundamental contradictions that are reminiscent of
the problems of high turnover among overqualified workers in the monotonous
jobs found in U.S. manufacturing industries in the 1960s and 1970s. Current
analyses of the potential for high-quality service in offshore centers give too
much weight to the level of formal education among workers and too little
weight to the organization of work and technology, which shape the effective use
of that human capital.29
However, case study evidence by Rafiq Dossani (this volume) shows that
some call centers have been able to move up the value chain and expand their
operations to include increasingly complex processes. Whether these examples
of best practice can expand to the majority of call centers in India remains to be
seen. This question turns on whether the current approach to managing vendor
relations—through tight control by client firms—is considered so fundamental
to limiting costs and operational risk that it will not be abandoned, or whether it
is a temporary phenomenon that will give way over time to closer supplier rela-
tions built on trust. In the former case, the Indian call center sector would con-
tinue to handle relatively simple, codifiable, low-value-added transactions. In
the latter case, the offshore market could expand to cover a much larger portion
of the U.S. customer contact business. Even here, however, companies will need
to learn much more about what kinds of tacit knowledge and contextual under-
standings are needed for which types of customer interactions. In service set-
tings where “bridging to sales” is a major source of revenues, for example, tacit
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knowledge of cultural norms may still be an important source of competitive
advantage, thereby favoring U.S. in-house or outsourced locations.
A third alternative could involve a combination of organizational forms, with
companies using a number of in-house, outsourced, and offshore venues to man-
age similar types of customer interactions. In our field research, we found several
instances of this emerging strategy; and Ravi Aron and Ying Liu in this volume
demonstrate that this “extended” model of organization may hold the most prom-
ise for quality and productivity in the long run. This approach allows companies
to create competition for cost and quality innovations among their own sub-
sidiaries and vendors. It also allows for organizational flexibility, so that client
firms can adjust volumes and vendor contracts to seasonal demand. Similarly,
some U.S. multinational subcontractors are offering a variety of venues to client
firms, including a combination of onshore and offshore call centers, with volumes
able to fluctuate according to seasonal demand. These strategies may help U.S.
subcontractors survive as client firms exert ongoing pressure to reduce costs.
These scenarios also depend on the role that public policy plays in human
resource development. In India, there is evidence that demand is outstripping the
supply of skilled labor, at least in the short run, in call centers in cities such as
Bangalore and Chennai. Thus, there is a need for the Indian government to invest
in the skills and human resource infrastructure required to respond to external
demand.
In the United States, the question is whether subcontractors will be able to
improve the skill base of the workforce. They may be able to do so in locations
where they have access to certification programs and community college pro-
grams in customer service management. Because centers are often co-located in
“call center cities”—such as Jacksonville, Tucson, San Antonio, Omaha, or
Phoenix—there may be opportunities to build a skilled labor pool with access to
ongoing education and opportunities for multi-employer job ladders that help
stabilize employment. Our survey results suggest that public support for the
industry is available, with 49 percent of outsourced call centers reporting that
they use public training resources and programs. Nearly all of the managers we
interviewed in the outsourced industry relied heavily on local universities, com-
munity colleges, and partnerships with welfare-to-work and public sector organ-
izations to recruit employees. These resources offer the potential to improve the
quality of the workforce. However, we found that they are often used to substi-
tute for internal investments in employee skills and discretion rather than to sup-
port a more professional or high-commitment strategy. Thus, while these types
of innovations could allow U.S. subcontractors to improve the quality of their
workforce and employment practices, the limited evidence in our study suggests
Rosemary Batt, Virginia Doellgast, and Hyunji Kwon 359
that public sector resources are being used to supplant, rather than complement,
private investment in human resource systems. If this represents the future
among U.S. subcontractors, then they are unlikely to remain competitive with
their Indian counterparts.
Appendix. Estimates of U.S. Call Center Workforce, 2004
To estimate the number of call center jobs in the United States, we used the
May 2004 Occupational Employment and Wage Survey of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. We chose “office and administrative support occupations” (NAICS 43-
0000). Within that category, we chose the suboccupations that were most likely
to be located in call centers, based on the BLS description of work tasks and our
own knowledge of call center operations. We also included telemarketers from
sales occupations. Table A-1 details the employment numbers, percent of sam-
ple, and mean wages for those suboccupations.
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Table A-1. Employment and Compensation in Typical Call Center Occupations,
United States 
Mean Mean
U.S. hourly annual
Number workforce wage wage
Call center work tasks employed (percent) (dollars) (dollars)
Switchboard, answering services 206,370 0.15 10.81 22,490
Telephone operators 38,500 0.03 14.53 30,220
Bill and account collectors 445,180 0.32 13.95 29,010
Credit authorizers and checkers 66,010 0.05 15.15 31,520
New accounts clerks 96,560 0.07 13.55 28,180
Order clerks 289,830 0.21 12.85 26,730
Reservation agents, travel clerks 
(excludes travel agents, hotel clerks) 159,910 0.11 14.48 30,120
Insurance claims and policy 
processing clerks 239,250 0.17 14.70 30,580
Customer service representatives 2,021,350 1.45 14.01 29,130
Telemarketers 410,360 0.29 11.29 23,490 
Total call center workers 3,973,320 2.85 13.53a 28,147a
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2004 (www.bls.gov/oes).
a. Weighted average, weighted by number employed by occupational group. By this methodology, there were an estimated 3.97 mil-
lion call center workers in the United States in 2004, representing 2.85 percent of the working population. This estimate, however,
undercounts some workers while overcounting others. Overcounting may occur because some of the workers in the categories provide
face-to-face service. Undercounting occurs because this tabulation does not include other sales agents besides telemarketers, and many
call centers define their work as primarily sales. If one subgroup of sales agents is also included (“sales representatives, services, other”
[NAICS 41-3099]), then the estimated number of call center workers rises to 4.33 million, or 3.11 percent of the workforce. By these
calculations, a reasonable estimate of the U.S. call center workforce in 2004 is between 2.5 and 3 percent of the U.S. workforce. This
estimate is considerably higher than that found in reports by industry consultants. It may overstate the current numbers of jobs in call
centers, but it includes jobs that, if not now organized into call centers, are prime targets for call centers in the future.
Comment
and Discussion
Vivek Agrawal: The empirical data presented by Professor Batt confirm what
many observers of the call center industry have long believed. Companies are
taking a highly prescriptive approach to managing offshore call centers, a stance
that risks continuing low rates of talent retention and an inability of providers to
move up the value chain.
However, there is another important implication of Professor Batt’s findings:
prescriptive management is also stifling innovation at these centers and therefore
depriving them of a significant amount of economic value. McKinsey calcula-
tions show that if companies were to innovate and optimize call center processes,
especially rethinking the proportion of labor and capital costs, they could cap-
ture an additional 20–30 percent savings on top of what they are achieving today.
Reasons behind the Prescriptive Management Approach
Professor Batt notes that companies are taking the prescriptive management
approach for good reason: they believe that they must take action to manage the
inherent risks of operating in an unknown environment. This is generally true
for all offshored services, but is particularly true of call centers. Companies are
more careful when offshoring call centers because of the real-time nature of
their services. In call centers, the process itself becomes the product; that is,
how a call center runs its processes is precisely how its customers experience
the “product.” So an understandable nervousness and anxiety exists on the part
of companies procuring call center services offshore about how that service is
performed. This is not true in other areas—manufacturing, for example. When
procuring offshored manufactured goods, companies are willing to accept
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improvisation in production techniques so long as the end product meets their
end-product specifications. In call center services, however, companies have man-
dated a cookbook approach to managing procedures. Although Batt and her col-
leagues have studied restrictive management practices at the agent level, I would
argue that restrictive management is also happening at the managerial level.
The long-term implications of the cookbook approach to managing employ-
ees go beyond just talent quality and retention. Innovation could offer compa-
nies a major competitive advantage. Those that do not encourage it could soon
find that their competitors are achieving significantly higher levels of productiv-
ity and cost savings.
Achieve Savings by Innovating Processes
According to the cookbook philosophy, in offshoring centers, managers’incen-
tives (bonuses, promotions) are tied to their ability to adhere to the cookbook.
Supervisors are given incentives to do exactly as they are told. This is starkly dif-
ferent from the managerial role in manufacturing, where managers are given incen-
tives to innovate. In fact, supervisors at offshored services centers are “punished”
if found to “innovate.”
However, the need for innovating process templates is significantly more
important in services than in manufacturing. This is because, unlike in manu-
facturing, the proportion of labor to capital costs in services performed onshore
is fundamentally different from that in an offshore location. On shore, 70 per-
cent of cost is labor, 30 percent is capital. Offshore, 70 percent is capital, 30 per-
cent is labor. Yet companies mandate that offshore centers operate exactly as they
would onshore. They plug in the cheap labor and are content with the resulting
savings. 
Manufacturers think about these issues differently. For example, the paint shops
in a BMW plant in South Africa are far less mechanized than in Munich, but
achieve the same quality. As long as the end product meets the required specifi-
cations, BMW has adjusted its inputs to make the optimal labor-capital tradeoffs
(see figure 1). 
But flexibility in changing the proportion of capital to labor costs is generally
not permitted in the offshore call centers. As a result, offshore call centers have
employees being paid a fraction of onshore wages, but with infrastructure that is
identical to that of onshore call centers. The offshore worker is required to use
the equipment, with the equipment idling the same amount of time as in onshore
environments. As a result, total factor productivity at offshore centers is far lower
than its potential.
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Companies in low-wage environments can make capital-labor tradeoffs in a
number of ways: (1) they can reduce capital inputs by reducing automation;
(2) they can use cheaper indigenously developed technology such as locally
developed programs in place of branded expensive software; or (3) they can uti-
lize capital more intensively. Capital can be used more intensively in two ways:
by increasing shift utilization—that is, by running the call center round the clock,
or by changing a process in order to reduce the downtime for capital equipment
(see figure 2). Redesigning a task or a process to use capital more intensively
bears some elaboration.
Consider the simple example of a call center agent who manages customer
accounts. In a high-wage country, each customer call is routed to an agent who
listens to the request, opens up a computer database, and updates the account in
real time. Neither the computer nor the telephone is used efficiently, since the
agent is either talking or typing, seldom doing both simultaneously. The call takes
longer, tying up telecommunications time, and keeping other customers on hold
longer. However, an offshore agent equipped with only a telephone could write
the customer request by hand into a tracking log and move on to the next call.
Telecom costs are reduced because the agent spends less time on calls and cus-
tomers less time on hold. Another agent, working at a computer station used around
the clock, could enter the information into the database. While the new process
requires more agents to handle requests, expensive computer hardware and soft-
ware and telephone lines are used more intensively. Added wages are more than
offset by savings on computers, software licenses, and telephone connections.
The economics of an Indian call center suggest that this simple change could
actually boost current profit margins for offshoring vendors by as much as 50 per-
cent (see figure 3). 
This approach of disaggregating the value chain and reengineering processes
to use capital more intensively can be used across a whole range of processes
beyond call centers, even for knowledge-based services such as research and other
information jobs.
Innovation Will Soon Be a Competitive Imperative
Why do companies hesitate to change established process templates, pre-
ferring to lose these gains, and how long do we expect this trend to continue?
The answer lies in achieving sufficient competitive intensity in offshore loca-
tions. Today, a company that decides to go offshore is ahead of its competitors.
The senior country manager who sets up an operation in India, the Philippines,
or another low-wage country is given a budget and is told to produce the
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2
4
6
8
10
Variable costs
Fixed costs
One shift per day
(eight hours)
Two shifts per day
(sixteen hours)
Three shifts per day
(twenty-four hours)
Dollars/seat/hour
Figure 2. Call Center Operating Costa
Source: McKinsey Global Institute.
a. Author performed similar calculations for five other sectors (not shown). Call centers exhibited the largest potential savings.
50 percent
lift in profit
margins
Current
profit
margin
Impact of
increase in
transactions
processing
time on labor
(five minutes)
Impact of
process
reengineering
(increased shift
utilization
by five
minutes)
Impact of task
reengineering
(reduction in
software
licensing
costs)
Total
Penalty on
labor 
productivity
Improvement in capital
productivity
Net impact
Dollars/billable seat/hour
0.20 4.60
3.00 (1.20)
2.60
Figure 3. Savings from Process Reengineering in Management of Customer Accounts
Source: McKinsey Global Institute.
expected 40–50 percent savings. The manager has little incentive to rock the
boat by changing proven ways of doing things. For the company, 40–50 per-
cent is significant enough savings. Seventy percent would certainly be great,
but there is a risk involved in doing something completely unproven. And given
that the company’s competitors have typically not achieved even this level of
savings, there is limited pressure to go the extra mile. 
However, as providers in low-wage countries ramp up capabilities, the low-
wage location advantage will become a commodity. More and more companies
will come to view offshoring as less risky. To some extent this is already hap-
pening. As this trend accelerates, and the industry frontrunners can no longer take
comfort in the 40–50 percent savings they are achieving today, they will be
forced to innovate and capture the additional 20 percent. Qualified profession-
als in low-wage destinations for offshoring are bubbling with ideas to increase
capital productivity. For now, though, companies are not allowing them the room
to innovate and go beyond the 50 percent cost savings achieved simply by mov-
ing operations to low-wage environments. I expect this will soon change.
General Discussion: The formal presentations stimulated a wide-ranging
conversation that focused especially on whether offshore call center operations
might change dramatically over time to better optimize for local conditions and
on whether the strikingly higher rates of attrition in offshoring relative to in-house
call center operations might signal the demise of that organizational form.
Alan Deardorff was struck by the finding that the offshore call centers were
using their skilled labor suboptimally. He conjectured that in India fluency in
English is most likely a proxy for high education levels. Thus, the call centers
might be deploying this labor suboptimally because they are hiring solely for
English fluency and not optimizing over the remaining educational capabilities
of their employees. 
Deardorff also wondered whether there might be useful survey data on the
amount of time actually consumed by individual calls, conjecturing that the lower
wage levels in India might reduce employers’ sensitivity to call times as a cost
variable and thus loosen the time limits imposed on employees in offshore call
centers. Susan Collins agreed that the information would be valuable but cau-
tioned that it might be difficult to interpret different average call times if differ-
ent classes of call centers are handling calls of different complexity.
T. N. Srinivasan argued it is premature to judge the innovation capabilities of
call centers. The precise amount of risk involved with an offshoring project re-
mains largely unknown because Indian providers are still undergoing a learning
process. Although the majority of offshore call center managers currently must
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follow strict procedures without much leeway to innovate independently, this prac-
tice may be a means to assess the performance and risks associated with off-
shoring. Once it is better understood that the risk is relatively low, it will be more
likely that the benefits from giving a center more freedom to innovate will be
achieved. 
Srinivasan took issue with Vivek Agarwal’s projection that offshore call cen-
ters were likely in the future to choose a different mix of labor and capital to take
advantage of the relatively lower cost of labor in India. He cited the poor over-
all empirical record of “appropriate” technology—technology tailored to local
conditions. However, Gary Saxonhouse cited Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as exam-
ples of emerging markets that have successfully adapted technology developed
for high-wage environments to local factor prices.
Lael Brainard also focused on the potential for further cost savings from
adjusting the technology to local conditions in the offshore market. She noted
the striking similarity between Vivek Agarwal’s conjecture that there are sub-
stantial unrealized cost savings in offshore call center operations and Ravi Aron’s
findings in financial services. The impetus to push costs down further in the off-
shore operations appears to be temporarily absent, she said, because the initial
cost savings of migrating these processes offshore are so substantial and because
of the perceived risk of departing from the highly codified initial model. But
Brainard argued that this is likely to change and thus that the offshoring phe-
nomenon may still be in the early stages of driving productivity increases and
cost savings across a range of industries. As competition increases, the differen-
tials will become even more dramatic.
Catherine Mann asked whether the sample could be stratified by industry, con-
jecturing that the comparisons between in-house versus offshore call center oper-
ations could lead to very different results depending on the industry being
represented in the available data.
Rishi Daga from Reliance commented on the difficulty of accurately meas-
uring attrition rates at offshored call centers and suggested the survey data may
actually understate attrition rates. In his company’s experience, attrition rates aver-
aged between 25 and 30 percent for back office processes, about 50 percent for
inbound call centers, and 70 to 75 percent for direct marketing and telemarket-
ing. The attrition rates are disguised because many vendors in India and the Philip-
pines retain call center employees on the company payroll for twelve to eighteen
months as temporary workers. Since these workers are not regular employees,
attrition on their part may not show up in the official numbers.
Rafiq Dossani noted that both presentations gave credence to the prediction
that the model of the independent call center—recently hailed as the future of
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the industry—might actually be failing because of unmanageably high attrition.
In turn, he speculated that the call center function may be far less separable from
the overall business process than is widely believed. The successful call centers
were integrated into in-house operations, and the greater stability and success of
the in-house call centers may be attributable to the fact that they can do other
tasks as well. In contrast, outsourced offshore call center employees have much
less flexibility.
Susan Collins requested that the authors add more information about how the
relative importance of the different type of organizational forms had changed
over time, and whether the data supported Rafiq Dossani’s provocative assertion
that the independent call center model had failed.
Richard Freeman noticed that unionization appeared to reduce attrition sig-
nificantly and wondered whether this applied to unionization of offshore opera-
tions or only to U.S.-based operations.
Chad Bown thought it was important to compare the offshore call center attri-
tion rates with the average turnover rate in the local market rather than only with
the U.S.-based call center operations. He noted that the authors’ findings might
be even bigger if the outside options for call center workers in these countries
have much lower turnover on average.
Douglas Kaden of Oak Hill provided support for the paper’s inference that
processes are more tightly controlled when they are offshored. He noted a com-
pany that selected only processes that could be tightly controlled for offshoring
discovered during the migration process that only 50 percent of these highly
controllable activities were actually subject to tight controls by the in-house
domestic operation.
Rosemary Batt first addressed the question of how to measure complexity in
this industry and how to control for it. First, she and her coauthors eliminated the
business-to-business segment of call center operations because they are much
more complex and more concentrated in relationship management. The statisti-
cal analysis initially controlled for industry and work function within the mass
market broadly. However, since it was found to have no effect, it was taken out.
She noted that even within the mass-market segment, however, there are vary-
ing degrees of complexity depending on the quality of the customer interaction.
Furthermore, the process might be complex even if a product itself is not com-
plex. For example, in telecommunications packaging variety and customization
may require a call center operator to negotiate and interpret. Understanding those
nuances and selling product features introduces complexity. She also noted that
she is still struggling with issues raised in previous sessions about how difficult
it is to outsource sales.
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Batt noted that unionization is low for call centers overall but ranges as high
as 25 to 30 percent in the telecommunications sector. Wage rates for the union-
ized workers are $40,000 a year rather than the average $30,000 for in-house call
center employees. She also noted that the communications workers union recently
negotiated major reductions in wages in order to keep the frontline work in-house.
Finally, Batt ventured that the independent call center model may be less fragile
than it appears because consumers demonstrate an apparent high tolerance for
poor quality.
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